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Abstract
From the beginning of chaos research until today, the unpredictability of chaos
has been a central theme. It is widely believed and claimed by philosophers,
mathematicians and physicists alike that chaos has a new implication for unpre-
dictability, meaning that chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way that other
deterministic systems are not. Hence one might expect that the question ‘What
are the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’ has already been an-
swered in a satisfactory way. However, this is not the case. I will critically
evaluate the existing answers and argue that they do not fit the bill. Then I
will approach this question by showing that chaos can be defined via mixing,
which has never before been explicitly argued for. Based on this insight, I will
propose that the sought-after new implication of chaos for unpredictability is the
following: for predicting any event all sufficiently past events are approximately
probabilistically irrelevant.
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2
1 Introduction
In the past decades much ado has been made about chaos research, which has been
hailed as having led to revolutionary scientific insights. Since the beginnings of sys-
tematically investigating chaos until today, the unpredictability of chaotic systems has
been at the centre of interest.
There is widespread belief in the philosophy, mathematics and physics communities
(and it has been claimed in various articles and books) that there is a new implication
of chaos for unpredictability, meaning that chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way
other deterministic systems are not. More specifically, what is usually believed is that
there is at least one new implication of chaos for unpredictability that holds true in all
chaotic systems.
The physicist James Lighthill, commenting on the impact of chaos on unpredicta-
bility, expresses this point as follows:
We are all deeply conscious today that the enthusiasm of our forebears for the
marvellous achievements of Newtonian mechanics led them to make generaliza-
tions in this area of predictability which, indeed, we may have generally tended
to believe before 1960, but which we now recognize were false (Lighthill [1986],
p. 38).
These features connected with predictability that I shall describe from now on,
then, are characteristic of absolutely all chaotic systems (Ibid., p. 42).
Similarly, Weingartner ([1996], p. 50) says that ‘the new discovery now was that [...] a
dynamical system obeying Newton’s laws [...] can become chaotic in its behaviour and
practically unpredictable’.
Thus the question ‘What are the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’
appears natural, and one might well suppose that it has already been satisfactorily
answered. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, there is a lot of confusion
about what exactly the new implications of chaos for unpredictability are. Several
answers have been proposed, but, as we will see, none of them fit the bill.
Fundamental questions about the limits of predictability have always been of concern
to philosophy. So the widespread belief and the various flawed accounts about the new
implications of chaos for unpredictability demand clarification. The aim of this paper
is to critically discuss existing accounts and to propose a novel and more satisfactory
answer.
My answer will be based on two insights. First, I will show that chaos can be
defined in terms of mixing. Although mixing is occasionally mentioned in connection
with chaos, to the best of my knowledge, so far no one has explicitly argued that chaos
can be thus defined. Second, I will argue that mixing has a natural interpretation as
a particular form of approximate probabilistic irrelevance which is a form of unpre-
dictability. On this basis I will propose a general novel answer: a new implication of
chaos for unpredictability is that for predicting any event at any level of precision, all
sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically irrelevant.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will provide the background of
our discussion. I will introduce dynamical systems, and I will discuss the concepts of
unpredictability relevant for this paper. Section 3 will be about chaos. Here I will show
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that chaos can be defined in terms of mixing. After that, in section 4 I will examine the
existing answers to the question of the new implications of chaos for unpredictability,
which I dismiss as mistaken. In section 5 I propose a general answer that does not
suffer from the shortcomings of the other accounts.
2 Dynamical Systems and Unpredictability
2.1 Dynamical Systems
Chaos is discussed in dynamical systems theory. A dynamical system is a mathemat-
ical model consisting of a phase space X, the set of all possible states of the system,
and evolution equations that describe how solutions evolve in phase space. Dynamical
systems often model natural systems (e.g. in the sciences).
There are discrete dynamical systems and continuous dynamical systems. Discrete
dynamical systems are systems in which the time increases in discrete steps. Formally,
they consist of a set X as phase space and a map T : X → X as evolution equation;
the dynamics of the system is given by xn+1 = T (xn), x0 ∈ X, n ∈ N0. The solu-
tion through x is the sequence (T n(x))n≥0, which is also referred to as the iterates of
x. If T is invertible (noninvertible), I speak of an invertible (noninvertible) discrete
dynamical system, respectively. Continuous dynamical systems involve a continuous
time parameter. They typically arise from differential equations. By definition, all
dynamical systems and thus chaotic systems are deterministic.1
For simplicity I will often confine my attention to discrete dynamical systems. I can
do this without loss of generality because all definitions of chaos I will be using can
be directly carried over to continuous dynamical systems. Alternatively, a continuous
dynamical system can be regarded as chaotic if and only if there is a suitable Poincare´
section such that the discrete dynamical system defined by the Poincare´ map is chaotic
(e.g. Smith [1998], pp. 92–3). Hence everything I will say about the new implications
of chaos for unpredictability equally applies to continuous dynamical systems.
Dynamical systems divide into two groups: volume-preserving systems, among them
Hamiltonian systems, and dissipative systems. A volume-preser-ving system is defined
as a system in which the phase-space volume is preserved under time evolution, i.e. the
volume (formally the Lebesgue measure) of any region of phase space remains the same
as this region is evolved according to the evolution equations (Smith [1998], p. 16).
Dissipative systems are systems which are not volume-preserving.
There are two types of dynamical systems relevant for our discussion. First, if for
a discrete system there is a metric d, where d measures the distance between points
in phase space, (X, d, T ) is called a ‘topological dynamical system’. It is generally
assumed in the literature (e.g. Devaney [1986], p. 51), that topological systems provide
a possible framework for characterising chaos. This makes intuitive sense because it is
often imagined that in case of chaotic behaviour there is some way of measuring the
distance between points in the phase space X and thus that there is a metric defined
on X. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, there is always a natural metric for
1According to the conventional definition of Montague ([1962]) and Earman ([1971]), a dynamical
system is deterministic if and only if any two solutions that agree at one time agree at all future times.
4
paradigmatic chaotic systems. Often the phase space is simply a subset of Rn, n ≥ 1,
and the metric is the standard Euclidean metric.
The second type of dynamical system is a measure-theoretic dynamical system. It is
a quadruple (X,Σ, µ, T ) consisting of a phase space X, a σ-algebra Σ on X, a measure
µ with µ(X) = 1 and a surjective measurable map T : X → X. If a property holds for
all points in a subset X¯ of X for which µ(X¯) = 1, it is said that it holds for almost all
points.
Important for us is what is called a ‘measure-preserving dynamical system’. It is a
measure-theoretic system where for all A ∈ Σ
µ(T−1(A)) = µ(A), (1)
where T−1(A) = {x ∈ X : T (x) ∈ A} (cf. Cornfeld et al. [1982], pp. 3–5). Condition (1)
says that the measure µ is invariant under the dynamics of the system. Although there
exist evolution equations that do not have invariant measures, for very wide classes of
systems invariant measures can be proven to exist. For instance, if T is a continuous
map on a compact phase space endowed with a metric, there exists at least one invariant
measure (Man˜e´ [1983], p. 52).2
As it is sometimes claimed (e.g. Eckmann and Ruelle [1985]), measure-preserving
systems provide a possible framework for characterising chaos. For volume-preserving
systems the natural invariant measure is typically the Lebesgue measure or a normalized
Lebesgue measure, e.g. the microcanonical measure of classical statistical mechanics.
For dissipative systems, to the best of my knowledge, all systems that have ever been
identified as chaotic have or are supposed to have a natural invariant measure if one
considers the following.
Many chaotic systems have attractors. For a topological system (Y, d, T ) the set
Λ ⊂ Y is an attractor if and only if (i) T (Λ) = Λ; (ii) there is a neighbourhood U ⊃ Λ
such that all solutions are attracted by Λ, i.e. for all y in U limn→∞ inf{d(T n(y), x) |x ∈
Λ} = 0; and (iii) no proper subset of Λ satisfies (i) and (ii). Liouville’s theorem implies
that only dissipative systems can have attractors (Schuster and Just [2005], p. 162).3
As we will see in the next section, for chaotic systems the evolution of any bundle of
initial conditions eventually enters every region in phase space. This is impossible for
the motion approaching an attractor since the attracted solutions never return to where
they originated. Hence chaotic behaviour can only occur on Λ. The chaotic motion is
described by a system with phase space Λ, and the invariant measure is only defined on
Λ. Generally, an attractor on which the motion is chaotic is called a ‘strange attractor ’.
Of course, in practice one is often concerned with solutions approaching a strange at-
tractor. Yet after a sufficiently long duration either the solutions enter the attractor or
come arbitrarily near to the attractor. In the latter case since the dynamics is typically
continuous, when the solutions are sufficiently near to the attractor, they essentially
2Descriptions of a dynamical system via metric spaces and measures are usually related in the
following way: the σ-algebra Σ of a measure-theoretic system is, or at least includes, the Borel σ-
algebra of the metric space (X, d) of the topological system. The Borel σ-algebra of (X, d) is the
σ-algebra generated by all open sets of X (cf. Man˜e´ [1983], pp. 2–3). Intuitively, it is the σ-algebra
which arises from the metric space (X, d).
3Some other definitions of ‘attractor’ allow that volume-preserving systems can have attractors; yet
these definitions are not standard in our context.
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behave like the solutions on the attractor. And in applications such solutions which are
sufficiently near to a strange attractor are considered to be chaotic for practical pur-
poses. In particular, in the latter case the unpredictability of solutions very near to the
attractor is practically indistinguishable from the one on the attractor. Consequently,
for characterising the unpredictability of motion dominated by strange attractors, it
is widely acknowledged that it suffices to consider the dynamics on attractors, where
natural invariant measures can be defined.
2.2 Natural Invariant Measures
What are natural invariant measures, in particular for dissipative systems? From an
observational viewpoint it is natural to demand that the long-run time-averages of
almost all solutions approximate the measure. Such measures are called ‘physical mea-
sures’. Let us look at them in more detail (cf. Eckmann and Ruelle [1985], p. 626 and
pp. 639–40).
For measure-preserving systems (X,Σ, µ, T ) with λ(X) > 0, where λ is the Lebesgue
measure, the following method identifies physical measures. (M1) (i) Take any A ⊆ X.
(ii) Take an initial condition x ∈ X. (iii) Consider LA(x), the long-run average of the
fraction of iterates of x which are in A. (iv) Consider GA = {x ∈ X |LA(x) = µ(A)}.
Then µ is a physical measure if and only if for any A ∈ Σ Lebesgue-almost all initial
conditions approximate the measure of A, i.e. λ(GA) = λ(X). If such a measure exists,
it is unique.
What are physical measures for strange attractors? I will be concerned with two
kinds of strange attractors: first, the case where all solutions eventually enter an attrac-
tor Λ with λ(Λ) > 0. Clearly, here method (M1) can be applied for X = Λ. Second,
it can be that the solutions approach but never enter an attractor Λ with λ(Λ) = 0
but λ(U) > 0, where U is the neighbourhood of Λ. Here the method has to be slightly
modified. (M2): (i) Take any region A ⊆ Λ. (ii) Take an initial condition x ∈ U . (iii)
Consider L¯A(x), the long-run average of the fraction of iterates of x which are close to
A. (iv) Consider G¯A = {x ∈ U | L¯A(x) = µ(A)}. Then µ is a physical measure if and
only if for all A ∈ Σ it holds that λ(G¯A) = λ(U). If such a measure exists, it is unique.
As we will see in the next section, chaotic systems are ergodic. A measure-preserving
system (X,Σ, µ, T ) is ergodic if and only if for all A ∈ Σ with µ(A) > 0:
µ(∪n≥0T−n(A)) = 1. (2)
Now for ergodic volume-preserving systems the Lebesgue-measure is the physical mea-
sure. As we will see in the next section, typically for systems proven to be chaotic
physical measures can be proven to exist (Lyubich [2002]; Young [2002]). For system
only conjectured to be chaotic numerical evidence generally favours the existence of
physical measures (Young [1997]).
For an example consider the logistic map T (x) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], T (x) = αx(1 − x)
with α ≈ 3.6785. Here the solutions enter an attractor of positive Lebesgue measure.
Now we choose an initial condition on the attractor and draw a histogram of the fraction
of iterates of x (up to an iterate T n(x), n ≥ 1) which are in a particular part on the
attractor. Then, for Lebesgue-almost all initial conditions we chose on the attractor, we
obtain what is illustrated in Figure 1: as n goes to infinity and the histogram becomes
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Figure 1: (a) histogram and (b) natural measure of the logistic map for α ≈ 3.6785
finer, the histograms approximate a particular measure on the attractor. Hence this
measure is physical according to method (M1) (cf. Jacobson [1981]).
For another example consider the Lorenz equations
dx(t)
dt
= σ(y(t)− x(t))
dy(t)
dt
= rx(t)− y(t)− x(t)z(t) (3)
dz(t)
dt
= x(t)y(t)− bz(t),
for the parameter values σ = 10, r = 28 and b = 8/3, which Lorenz ([1963]) considered.
Here it is proven that there is a strange attractor of Lebesgue measure zero such that
all solutions originating in the neighbourhood of the attractor, which is of positive
Lebesgue measure, approach but never enter the system. Figure 2 shows a numerical
solution of these equations; one can vaguely discern the shape of the attractor, known as
the Lorenz attractor, because the solution spirals toward it. According to the method
(M2), the physical measure is the one for which for the following condition holds: for
Lebesgue-almost-all initial conditions in the neighbourhood of the attractor the long-run
time-average a solution is close to a set A on the attractor approximates the measure
of A (cf. Luzzatto et al. [2005]).4
Invariant measures are commonly interpreted as probability densities. This deep
and controversial issue has, of course, been discussed in statistical mechanics but is
4 There are also other natural measures. For instance, ν is absolutely continuous with respect
to µ, where ν and µ are measures on a measurable space (X,Σ), if and only if for all A ∈ Σ with
µ(A) = 0 also ν(A) = 0. Absolute continuity with respect to the Lebesgue measure can be justified
(Malament and Zabell [1980]; van Lith [2001], p. 590). Hence if there is a unique ergodic invariant
measure absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it is a natural one. For ergodic
volume-preserving systems the Lebesgue measure is such a unique measure. For many systems, e.g.
wide classes of one-dimensional maps and, as we will see in the next section, many paradigmatic
dissipative chaotic systems including strange attractors, there is a unique ergodic measure absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (Lyubich [2002]). For instance, for the logistic map
with µ ≈ 3.6785 the measure of Figure 1(b) is such a unique measure (Jacobson [1981]).
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Figure 2: Numerical solution of the Lorenz equations for σ = 10, r = 28, b = 8/3
not the main focus of this paper. I only mention two interpretations that naturally
suggest interpreting measures as probability and relate to our discussion. According to
the time-average interpretation, the measure of a set A is the long-run time-average a
solution spends in A. According to the ensemble interpretation, the measure of a set A
at t corresponds to the fraction of solutions starting from some set of initial conditions
that are in A at time t (Berkovitz et al. [2006], p. 675).
2.3 Unpredictability
There are different kinds of unpredictability in dynamical systems. I will only introduce
two concepts needed for the discussion of our main question.
According to the first concept of unpredictability, a system is unpredictable when
any bundle of initial conditions spreads out more than a specific diameter represent-
ing the prediction accuracy of interest (usually of larger diameter than the one of the
bundle of initial conditions). When this happens, the system is unpredictable in the
sense that the prediction based on any bundle of initial conditions is so imprecise that
it is impossible to determine the outcome of the system with the desired prediction
accuracy.5 A well-known example is a system in which, due to exponential divergence
of solutions, any bundle of initial conditions of at least a specific diameter spreads out
over short time periods more than a diameter of interest.
The second concept of unpredictability is probabilistic. It says that for practical
purposes any bundle of initial conditions is irrelevant, i.e. makes it neither more nor less
likely that the state is in a region of phase space of interest. According to this concept,
it is not only impossible to predict with certainty in which region the system will be, but
in addition, for practical purposes knowledge of the possible initial conditions neither
heightens, nor lowers, the probability that the state is in a given region of phase space.
An example is that knowledge of any bundle of sufficiently past initial conditions is
practically irrelevant for predicting that the state of the system is in a region of phase
space. Eagle ([2005], p. 775) defines randomness as a strong form of unpredictability:
5Schurz ([1996], pp. 133–9) discusses several variants of this form of unpredictability.
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Figure 3: behaviour of the logistic map for α = 4
an event is random if and only if the probability of the event conditional on evidence
equals the prior probability of the event. This idea relativised to practical purposes
is at the heart of our second concept. Consequently, this second concept can also be
regarded as a form of randomness.
Clearly, the first and second concepts of unpredictability are different and cannot
be expressed in terms of each other since the notions of ‘diameter’ and ‘probability’ are
not expressible in terms of each other.
3 Chaos
3.1 Defining Chaos
I base the discussion of defining chaos on the following assumption, which is widely
accepted in the literature (e.g. Brin and Stuck [2002], p. 23; Devaney [1986], p. 51). A
formal definition of chaos is adequate if and only if
(i) it captures the main pretheoretic intuitions about chaos, and
(ii) it is extensionally correct (i.e. correctly classifies essentially all systems which, ac-
cording to the pretheoretic understanding, are uncontroversially chaotic or non-
chaotic).
Let us first direct our attention to (i). Roughly, chaotic systems are deterministic
systems showing irregular, or even random, behaviour and sensitive dependence to initial
conditions (SDIC). SDIC means that small errors in initial conditions lead to totally
different solutions.
The logistic map T : [0, 1] → [0, 1], T (x) = αx(1 − x) for α = 4 is a paradigmatic
chaotic system. Figure 3 shows the first six iterates of a small bundle of initial conditions
I, and suggests that any bundle blows up substantially. Thus the system appears to
exhibit SDIC. This figure also suggests that any bundle blows up until it covers the
whole phase space. Thus the motion appears not only to exhibit SDIC but also irregular
behaviour in the following sense: any bundle of initial conditions eventually intersects
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with any other region in phase space, a property called denseness. It is widely agreed
that SDIC and denseness are necessary conditions for chaos (Niellsen [1999], pp. 14–5;
Peitgen et al. [1992], pp. 509–21; Smith [1998], pp. 167–9). This motivates the following
criterion: a definition applying to dynamical systems captures the main pretheoretic
intuitions about chaos if and only if it implies SDIC and denseness.
Let us now discuss (ii), the requirement of extensional correctness. Imagine we are
concerned with a pretheoretic property P. Further, assume that we are faced with a class
of objects some of which uncontroversially have property P, others uncontroversially fail
to have property P, and yet others are borderline cases or controversial in some sense.
The task is to find an unambiguous definition of P. Then it is natural to say that
an unambiguous definition of the property P is extensionally correct if and only if it
classifies all objects correctly which uncontroversially have or do not have property P.
For the borderline objects it is unimportant how they are classified, and we defer to
the definition.
Being chaotic is such a property because the pretheoretic idea of chaos is somewhat
vague. Among the dynamical systems whose behaviour is mathematically well under-
stood, there is a broad class of uncontroversially chaotic systems and a broad class of
uncontroversially nonchaotic systems. Moreover, there are a few borderline cases, for
example the system discussed by Martinelli et al. ([1998], p. 199), where it is not clear
whether they are chaotic (Brin and Stuck [2002], p. 23; Robinson [1995], pp. 81–5;
Zaslavsky [2005], pp. 53–4). Consequently, I say that a formal definition of chaos is
extensionally correct if and only if it correctly classifies essentially all mathematically
well understood uncontroversially chaotic and nonchaotic behaviour.
Several definitions of chaos have been proposed (Lichtenberg and Lieberman [1992],
pp. 302–9; Robinson [1995], pp. 81–6). While these definitions are very similar, they
are all inequivalent. For want of space I cannot discuss all these definitions here and
instead focus on a definition of chaos in terms of mixing, which will be crucial later on.
3.2 Defining Chaos via Mixing
Intuitively speaking, the fact that a system is mixing means that any bundle of solutions
spreads out in phase space like a drop of ink in a glass of water. A measure-preserving
dynamical system (X,Σ, µ, T ) is mixing if and only if for all A,B ∈ Σ:
lim
n→∞
µ(T−n(B) ∩ A) = µ(B)µ(A). (4)
Mixing is occasionally mentioned in connection with chaos, usually only in the
context of volume-preserving systems (e.g. Lichtenberg and Liebermann [1992], pp. 302–
3; Schuster and Just [2005], p. 177). Yet, to the best of my knowledge, so far no one has
explicitly argued that chaos can thus be defined. I will argue for this and propose that
mixing is chaos : a system is chaotic if and only if it is mixing on the relevant subset of
X. More needs to be said about what qualifies as the relevant subset later on.
Since mixing was introduced before the 1960s, the beginning of the systematic in-
vestigation of chaos, it might seem puzzling that chaos can be adequately defined via
mixing. However, many formal definitions and measures of chaos were invented be-
fore the 1960s (Dahan-Dalmedico [2004], p. 70), but rather few systems were known
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to which these notions apply. Novel from the 1960s onwards was that many different
highly interesting systems, surprisingly also very simple systems, were found to which
these concepts apply.
Let us first discuss whether mixing captures the pretheoretic intuitions. Mixing
implies denseness: mixing systems are ergodic (Cornfeld et al. [1982], p. 25). By looking
at equation (2) we see that from this follows that any region, naturally interpreted as
a set of positive measure, eventually visits every region in phase space.
Mixing also implies SDIC. This can be seen as follows. Mixing implies that any
bundle of initial conditions spreads out uniformly over the phase space. Therefore, any
bundle eventually spreads out considerably, thus exhibiting SDIC. Formally, assume a
mixing measure-preserving system (X,Σ, µ, T ) is given where a metric d is defined on X
and Σ contains every open set of X. Further, assume that every open set has positive
measure.6 Consider two open sets O1 and O2 with 0 < ε := infx∈O1,y∈O2{d(x, y)}.
Mixing implies that for any open set O there is a n ≥ 0 such that T n(O) ∩O1 6= ∅ and
T n(O) ∩ O2 6= ∅. But this means that ε ≤ supx,y∈Tn(O){d(x, y)}. Hence the following
condition holds, which in definitions like Devaney chaos is taken to be the SDIC implied
by chaotic behaviour (Devaney [1986], p. 51):
There is a ε > 0 such that for all x ∈ X and for all δ > 0 (5)
there is a y ∈ X and a n ∈ N0 with d(x, y) < δ and d(T n(x), T n(y)) ≥ ε.
As SDIC is often linked to positive Liapunov exponents, let us now turn to a dis-
cussion of this issue. For a continuously differentiable T on an open X ⊆ R the
Liapunov-exponent of x ∈ X is
λ(x) := lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
log(|T ′(T i(x))|), (6)
where T ′ is the derivative of T (for a general definition see Man˜e´ [1983], p. 263). For
ergodic systems the Liapunov-exponent exists and is equal for all points except for a
set of measure zero (Robinson [1995], p. 86). Hence one can speak of the Liapunov-
exponent of a system. Accordingly, one definition of chaos that has been suggested is
that the system is ergodic and has a positive Liapunov-exponent.
From a positive Liapunov exponent it is commonly concluded that the SDIC shown
by chaos consists of the exponential spreading of inaccuracies over finite time periods
(e.g. Lighthill [1986], p. 46; Ott [2002], p. 140; Smith [1998], p. 15).7 However, this
is mistaken. Positive Liapunov exponents imply that for almost all points x in phase
space the average over all i ≥ 0 of log(|T ′(T i(x))|)—the exponential growth rate of an
inaccuracy at the point T i(x)—is positive. Here the average is taken for the solution
starting from x over an infinite time period. But positive on average exponential
growth rates over an infinite time period do not imply that nearby solutions diverge
exponentially or rapidly over finite time periods. The growth rate over finite time
6This is standardly assumed and, to the best of my knowledge, applies to all paradigmatic chaos
systems.
7With the qualification that the time periods have to be small enough such that the inaccuracy
does not eventually saturate at the diameter of the system.
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periods can be anything; inaccuracies can even shrink (Smith et al. [1999], pp. 2861–2).8
Furthermore, it is not true that inaccuracies of chaotic systems spread exponentially
or rapidly over finite time periods: for paradigmatic chaotic systems like the Lorenz
attractor there are regions where inaccuracies even shrink over finite time periods, and
numerical evidence suggests such regions for many chaotic systems (Smith et al. [1999],
p. 2881; Zaslavsky [2005], p. 315; Ziehmann et al. [2000], pp. 10–1).
Mixing systems need not have positive Liapunov exponents, and thus inaccuracies
need not grow exponentially on average as time goes to infinity. Is this a problem for
mixing as a definition of chaos? No. First, there is no agreement in the literature
whether chaos should show this on average exponential growth. Some definitions do
indeed demand it, others like Devaney chaos do not. Second, the arguments for requir-
ing positive Liapunov exponents are not convincing. The standard rationale is that the
SDIC shown by chaotic system has to be exponential divergence of nearby solutions
over finite time periods. But as shown above, this is not implied by a positive Liapunov
exponent and also does not generally hold for chaotic systems. Another possible ar-
gument is that for chaotic behaviour inaccuracies should spread out rapidly. Yet the
rate of divergence of mixing systems not having positive Liapunov exponents can be
much faster for arbitrary long time periods than for systems with positive Liapunov
exponents; thus it is not clear why positive Liapunov exponents should be required
(Berkovitz et al. [2006], p. 689; Wiggins [1990], p. 615). To conclude, mixing captures
the pretheoretic intuitions about chaos. It remains to show that mixing is extensionally
correct.
To do this, I have to consider the main classes of uncontroversially chaotic and
nonchaotic behaviour.9 I start with uncontroversially chaotic behaviour and first discuss
volume-preserving systems. There are (i) Hamiltonian system which are chaotic on the
whole hypersurface of constant energy. Three types of systems are mainly discussed
here: first, chaotic billiards, which are mixing (Chernov and Markarian [2006]; Ott
[2002], p. 296); second, hard sphere systems, which are either proven or conjectured
to be mixing (Berkovitz et al. [2006], pp. 679–80); third, geodesic flows of space with
negative Gaussian curvature, which are mixing (Schuster and Just [2005], p. 181).
Another class are (ii) Hamiltonian systems to which the KAM-theorem applies, e.g.
the He´non-Heiles system or the standard map. This class also includes simplified ver-
sions of Poincare´ maps of systems to which the KAM-theorem applies. The KAM-
theorem describes what happens when integrable systems are perturbed by a nonin-
tegrable perturbation. It says that tori with sufficiently irrational winding number
survive the perturbation. Between the stable motion on surviving tori there appear
to be regions of random motion. As the perturbation increases, these regions become
larger and often eventually cover nearly the entire hypersurface of constant energy.
For these systems the phase space is separated into regions, each of which has its
own dynamics: in some of them the motion appears random and in others it is stable.
8Moreover, Liapunov exponents only measure the average growth rate of an infinitesimal inaccuracy
around x, which is defined as the growth rate of a small ball of radius ε > 0 with centre x as ε → 0;
yet in practice the uncertainty is finite and may not behave like the infinitesimal one (cf. Bishop
[unpublished], p. 8).
9Obviously, I cannot discuss every single system regarded as clearly chaotic or nonchaotic. Yet our
discussion covers all main examples.
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Because of this separation into regions, random behaviour can only be found in a region.
Consequently, as is widely acknowledged, proper chaotic motion can only occur on a
region (Ott [2002], pp. 267–95; Schuster and Just [2005], pp. 165–74). Thus I have to
show that the mathematically well-understood random motion in a region is mixing.
Yet the conjectured chaotic motion of KAM-type systems is understood only poorly
(Zaslavsky [2005], p. 139). It has only been proven that there is chaotic behaviour
near hyperbolic fixed points, where the motion is indeed mixing (Moser [1973], chapter
3). Apart from this, some numerical evidence suggests that the motion conjectured to
be chaotic is mixing (e.g. Chirikov [1979]). Thus Lichtenberg and Liebermann ([1992],
p. 303) comment that we ‘expect that the stochastic orbits that we have encountered
in previous sections are mixing over the bounded portion of phase space for which they
exist’.
I should mention that numerical experiments suggest that for a few KAM-type maps
there are sets on which the motion seems somewhat random, but these sets consist of
n ≥ 2 component areas, each of which is mapped successively on to another, returning
to itself after n iterations. There is no agreement whether such motion, which cannot
be mixing, should be called ‘chaotic’ (e.g. Belot and Earman [1997], p. 154, vs. Ott
[2002], p. 300). If it is, chaos can still be defined via mixing: one can say that a system
is chaotic if and only if it is ergodic and its phase space is decomposable into n ≥ 1
sets with disjoint interior such that the n-th iterate is mixing on each of these sets. I
call this the ‘broad definition of chaos via mixing’. Numerical experiments suggest that
the behaviour mentioned above may be chaotic according to this definition (Ott [2002],
p. 303).
Next in line are (iii) chaotic volume-preserving non-Hamiltonian systems. Here the
main examples discussed are discrete. First, the baker’s map and volume-preserving
Anosov diffeomorphisms like the cat map, which are mixing (Arnold and Avez [1968],
p. 75; Lichtenberg and Liebermann [1992], p. 303). Second, paradigmatic chaotic sys-
tems are expanding piecewise maps like the tent map or the sawtooth map, which are
mixing too (Bowen [1977]).
I now turn to dissipative systems and first discuss strange attractors. One class are
(iv) strange attractors where the attracted solutions never enter the attractor. Three
main groups are treated here: first, for Smale’s Solenoid, and generalised Solenoid
systems, there is a measure on which the motion is mixing (Mayer and Roepstorff
[1983]). Second, for the system investigated by Lorenz ([1963]) and the Lorenz model,
and generalised versions thereof, there is a physical measure on which the motion is
mixing (Luzzatto et al. [2005]). Third, for generalised He´non systems like the He´non
map there exists a physical measure such that the motion on the attractor is mixing
(Benedicks and Young [1993]).
Also important is the (v) visible chaotic behaviour of generalised logistic systems like
the logistic map. For these discrete systems for most parameter values the solutions
enter an attractor with a physical measure on which the motion is either mixing or
chaotic according to the broad definition via mixing. But for a few parameter values
there is chaotic behaviour on the entire interval, e.g. for the logistic map with parameter
4; in these cases there is also a physical measure on which the motion is mixing (Jacobsen
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[1981]; Lyubich [2002]).10
Finally, another class is (vi) repelling chaotic behaviour on Cantor sets. Two main
kinds of discrete systems are discussed here: first, geometric horseshoe-systems like
Smale’s horseshoe, which are mixing (Robinson [1995], pp. 249–74). The second exam-
ple is chaotic motion on Cantor sets for the logistic map with parameter greater than
4, which is also mixing (Robinson [1995], p. 33).11
Let us now turn to uncontroversially nonchaotic motion. I again start with volume-
preserving systems. A paradigmatic class are (i) integrable Hamiltonian systems, where
there is periodic or quasi-periodic motion on tori, which is not mixing (Arnold and Avez
[1968], pp. 210–214).
Another class is the (ii) motion on clearly nonchaotic regions of KAM-type systems.
Again, this class also includes simplified versions of Poincare´ maps of KAM-type sys-
tems. As already discussed, for KAM-type systems the phase space is separated into
regions, and on some regions the motion is stable. Thus I have to show that the stable
motion is not mixing. And indeed, the behaviour in these regions, e.g. the motion on
surviving tori or the one near specific elliptic periodic points, is not mixing (Arnold and
Avez [1968], pp. 86–90; Lichtenberg and Liebermann [1992], chapter 3–5).
I now turn to dissipative systems. Important here are (iii) nonchaotic attractors.
These are attracting periodic cycles and fixed points and also quasi-periodic attractors
as discussed by Ott ([2002], chapter 7), which obviously cannot be mixing. Moreover,
the motion approaching such attractors, e.g. the behaviour around stable nodes or
stable foci, clearly cannot be mixing (cf. Robinson [1995], p. 105).12
Finally, let us mention two further very broad classes of clearly nonchaotic be-
haviour. Since mixing captures SDIC, (iv) systems not exhibiting any kind of SDIC,
e.g. the identity function, cannot be mixing.
Moreover, since mixing captures denseness, (v) motions showing SDIC but where,
in any sense, typical solutions do not come arbitrarily near to any region in phase space
cannot be mixing. Examples are the system xn+1 = cxn for c > 1 on (0,∞) or the
motion around unstable nodes or unstable foci (cf. Robinson [1995], p. 105).12
In sum, I have first demonstrated that mixing captures the pretheoretic intuitions
about chaos. After that I have briefly shown that a definition of chaos in terms of
mixing is extensionally correct in the sense explained above. Consequently, chaos can
be adequately defined in terms of mixing.
With this knowledge about chaos we are ready to critically discuss the answers
suggested in the literature to our main question.
10In all these cases the invariant measure is also the unique ergodic measure absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure (Jacobsen [1981]; Lyubich [2002]).
11This follows because these systems are isomorphic to a Bernoulli-shift.
12Here there often exists no invariant measure of interest.
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4 Criticism of Answers in the Literature
4.1 New: Asymptotically Unpredictable?
Let us first discuss an answer based on the concept of asymptotic unpredictability.
Roughly, systems whose asymptotic behaviour cannot be predicted with arbitrary ac-
curacy for all times, even if the bundle of initial conditions is made arbitrarily small,
are said to be asymptotically unpredictable. Let (X, d, T ) be a topological dynamical
system, ε be the desired prediction accuracy and δ be the diameter of the bundle of
initial conditions. For x ∈ X the solution (T n(x))n≥0 is asymptotically predictable if
and only if
∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀y ∈ X ∀n ≥ 0 (d(x, y) < δ → d(T n(x), T n(y)) < ε). (7)
A dynamical system is asymptotically unpredictable if and only if for all x ∈ X (T n(x))n≥0
is not asymptotically predictable.13 In terms of the distinction introduced in subsection
2.3, this is clearly a version of the first concept of unpredictability.
Miller ([1996], pp. 106–7) and Stone ([1989], p. 127) argue that the new implication
of chaos for unpredictability is that chaotic systems are asymptotically unpredictable.
Indeed, all chaotic systems discussed in the literature are asymptotically unpredictable,
and standard definitions of chaos imply asymptotic unpredictability. For instance, (5), a
condition of Devaney chaos and, under plausible assumptions, a consequence of mixing,
clearly implies asymptotic unpredictability.
However, as Smith ([1998], p. 58) has pointed out, many nonchaotic systems, e.g.
one only showing SDIC as it happens in the system xn+1 = cxn, c > 1, (class (v) of
clearly nonchaotic behaviour), are asymptotically unpredictable. Hence this account
is wrong. But maybe the account can be strengthened in the following way: the new
implication is that chaotic systems are asymptotically unpredictable and bounded. I
maintain that this is not correct either: there are unbounded chaotic systems (Smith
[1998], pp. 168–9), a point which is reflected in usual definitions of chaos, which do not
require boundedness. Furthermore, for many bounded integrable systems (part of class
(i) of the clearly nonchaotic behaviour) the solutions loop around tori in such a way
that they are asymptotically unpredictable (Arnold and Avez [1968], pp. 210–4). Hence
there are examples of nonchaotic, bounded and asymptotically unpredictable systems.
I conclude that the sole connection between asymptotic unpredictability and chaos
is this: while only some nonchaotic systems are asymptotically unpredictable, every
chaotic system is asymptotically unpredictable.
4.2 New: Unpredictable Due to Rapid or Exponential Diver-
gence of Solutions?
It is widely believed and often claimed that the new implication of chaos for unpre-
dictability is the following: due to rapid or exponential divergence of nearby solutions,
bundles of initial conditions spread out a distance more than a diameter of interest over
13Bishop ([2003], pp. 174–7) also aims to formalise asymptotic unpredictability. However, he does
not list the most obvious notion presented here.
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short time periods (e.g. Ruelle [1997], pp. 27–8); often it is added that this is so and the
systems are bounded (e.g. Lighthill [1986], p. 46). In terms of the distinction introduced
in subsection 2.3, this is a form of the first concept of unpredictability.
As many unbounded nonchaotic systems like the system xn+1 = cxn with c > 1
show (part of class (v) of clearly nonchaotic behaviour) rapid or exponentially diver-
gence everywhere is “nothing new” (Smith [1998], p. 15). Thus the version not requiring
boundedness cannot be true. But also the version requiring boundedness is wrong : as
mentioned above, there are unbounded chaotic systems. Furthermore, as argued in
subsection 3.2, it is often not true that nearby solutions of chaotic systems diverge
rapidly or exponentially over finite time periods as is so widely believed in the philo-
sophy, physics and mathematics communities (e.g. Eagle [2005], p. 767; Schurz [1996],
p. 140; Smith [1998], p. 15). Hence this is not the sought-after new implication of chaos
for unpredictability.
Why is it so widely believed that inaccuracies in chaotic systems spread rapidly
or exponentially over finite time periods? One plausible reason is that because very
simple systems like the cat map show this property, this claim is wrongly generalized to
all chaotic systems. Also, the wrong belief stems at least in part from misinterpreting
Liapunov exponents. As pointed out in subsection 3.2, positive on average exponential
growth rates over an infinite time period are wrongly taken to imply that inaccuracies
spread exponentially over finite time periods.
The only connection between the unpredictability of chaos and the rapid or expo-
nential increase of inaccuracies over finite time periods seems to be this: it is more
often the case for chaotic than for nonchaotic systems that bundles of initial conditions
spread out more than a diameter of interest over short time periods.
4.3 New: Macro-predictable & Micro-unpredictable?
Macro-predictable yet micro-unpredictable behaviour is a broad and interesting topic
in physics. For instance, in statistical mechanics systems are often macro-predictable
but micro-unpredictable. Here we concentrate only on whether there is any combina-
tion of macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability in chaotic systems that other
deterministic systems do not have.
To gain an understanding of this third proposed answer, recall the Lorenz equa-
tions (3) and Figure 2. These equations exhibit macro-predictability: the solutions
are attracted by an attractor, a small region of phase space. There is also micro-
unpredictability since the motion on the attractor exhibits SDIC. Peter Smith argues
that this combination of macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability is a new impli-
cation of chaos for unpredictability :
This type of combination of large-scale order with small scale disorder, of macro-
predictability with the micro-unpredictability due to sensitive dependence, is one
paradigm of what has come to be called chaos. [...] So error inflation by itself
is entirely old-hat. The novelty in the new-fangled chaotic cases that will con-
cern us is, to repeat, the combination of exponential error inflation with the
tight confinement of trajectories by an attractor (Smith [1998], pp. 13–5, original
emphasis).
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Here macro-predictability means that the system eventually shows the behaviour
corresponding to the motion on the attractor, a proper subset of phase space. Micro-
unpredictability is understood as the unpredictability implied by exponential error in-
flation. Yet, as shown in section 3, solutions of chaotic systems need not diverge expo-
nentially or rapidly over finite time periods. Therefore, micro-unpredictability has to
be interpreted as a weaker notion, e.g. asymptotic unpredictability (cf. subsection 4.1).
As becomes clear from the Lorenz system, strange attractors imply this combina-
tion of macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability. However, this combination is
no new implication of chaos for unpredictability since there are many chaotic systems
without attractors. As already pointed out, all chaotic volume-preserving dynamical
systems like chaotic Hamiltonian systems or the baker’s map (classes (i), (ii) and (iii)
of uncontroversially chaotic behaviour) cannot have attractors. And some chaotic dis-
sipative systems, e.g. repelling chaotic motion on Cantor sets or the logistic map on
[0, 1] (class (vi) and a part of class (v) of uncontroverially chaotic behaviour), have no
attractors. Hence these systems are not macro-predictable in the above sense, viz. that
appeals to attractors.
It could be that Smith ([1998]) only meant to say that this combination of macro-
predictability and micro-unpredictability found in strange attractors is a novelty for
systems with attractors. But this would not help. Clearly, this claim would be no
satisfying answer to our main question because it does not apply to essentially all chaotic
systems. Furthermore, also nonchaotic systems can be macro-predictable and micro-
unpredictable as discussed here. For instance, in the plane let R be the region enclosed
by a circle of radius r around the origin (boundary included). Imagine that all solutions
in R go in circles around the origin and that all solutions outside R are attracted by the
periodic motion in R such that all solutions are continuous. Such nonchaotic attractors
(part of class (iii) of clearly nonchaotic behaviour) obviously imply macro-predictability
and micro-unpredictability. Thus this combination of macro-predictability and micro-
unpredictability is not even a novelty for systems with attractors.
Of course, there are also other concepts of macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability
(e.g. Smith [1998], pp. 60–1). However, to the best of my knowledge, none of them
provides a combination of macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability that is char-
acteristic of chaotic behaviour.
To conclude, strange attractors are macro-predictable and micro-unpredictable in
the above specified sense. However, it is not the case that a combination of macro-
predictability and micro-unpredictability constitutes a new implication of chaos for
unpredictability.
None of the answers examined so far have proven to be correct. There is one more
answer suggested in the literature: some physicists, e.g. Ford ([1989]), have defined
chaos by the condition that almost all solutions have positive algorithmic complexity.
In other words they have argued that the unpredictability implied by positive algorith-
mic complexity is a new implication of chaos for unpredictability. However, Batterman
and White ([1996]) and Smith ([1998], p. 160) have made it clear that chaos cannot
be defined via algorithmic complexity since many systems without SDIC (part of class
(iv) of clearly nonchaotic behaviour) have positive algorithmic complexity too. Conse-
quently, this is no new implication of chaos for unpredictability, and this is all we need
to know.
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In sum, the answers in the literature do not fit the bill.
5 A General New Implication of Chaos for Unpre-
dictability
5.1 Approximate Probabilistic Irrelevance
The answer I propose starts from the well-known idea that mixing goes along with
loss of information as recently discussed by Berkovitz et al. ([2006]). First of all, let
us introduce the approximate probabilistic irrelevance, the notion of unpredictability
which will be crucial for our claim.
Given a measure-preserving system (X,Σ, µ, T ) it is common to associate with a set
A ∈ Σ a property PA, where PA holds if and only if the system’s
state is in A (Ibid., p. 671). For instance, for the logistic map with α = 4 interpreted
as a model of population dynamics (May [1976]), the set A = [0, 1/2) corresponds
to the property that the population is less than half of the maximum of the possible
population.
Because time is discrete, I can denote time points by tn, n ∈ Z, such that n increases
by one if the model is iterated once; for instance, if t4 corresponds to the iteration stage
T , t5 corresponds to T
2 etc. Given this, I define the event Atn as the occurrence of
the property PA at time tn. To come back to our example, A
tn is the event that the
population is less than half of the maximum possible population at time tn (Berkovitz
et al. [2006], p. 671).
Since the exact state of the system may not be known, I introduce p(Atn), the
probability of the event Atn . I also introduce conditional probabilities: p(Btm | Atn),
for arbitrary A, B ∈ Σ with µ(A) > 0, is the probability that PB obtains at time tm
given that PA obtained at tn (Ibid., p. 671). By the usual definition, p(B
tm | Atn) =
p(Btm&Atn)/p(Atn).
Now recall the second conception of unpredictability of subsection 2.3. For this
conception we have to say what it means that knowledge that the system is in a region
A at tn is practically irrelevant for predicting that it will be in B at tm. We say that this
is so if the probability of the event Btm given knowledge of the event Atn approximately
equals the unconditionalised probability of the event Btm . Let ε > 0 be the level at
which probabilities differing by less than ε are considered as practically equivalent.
Further, assume that p(Atn) > 0; I will later explain why I am justified to do so. Then
formally this is captured by the following definition:14
Atn is approximately probabilistically irrelevant for predicting Btm (8)
(tm ≥ tn) at level ε > 0 if and only if |p(Btm | Atn)− p(Btm)| < ε.
14I use what is basically the difference measure in confirmation theory to define the approximate
probabilistic irrelevance. I should point out that our claims are independent of the measure involved,
i.e. they would remain the same if I used any other measure with the indisputable property that it
is continuous when the unpredictability is highest, i.e. when p(Btm | Atn) = p(Btm). Berkovitz et
al. ([2006], p. 672) interpret the difference measure of events as a general measure of unpredictability.
However, they do not justify this choice or address whether their results are independent of the measure.
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How can we determine the values of the probabilities occurring in (8)? Because
the probabilities should reflect objective dynamical properties of systems, I say that
the probability of an event Atn corresponds to the measure of A (Ibid., p. 673). As
mentioned in subsection 2.1, this is quite natural under certain interpretations.
For all tn and for all A ∈ Σ : p(Atn) = µ(A). (9)
This idea can be generalised to joint simultaneous events as follows:
For all tn and for all A,B ∈ Σ : p(Atn&Btn) = µ(A ∩B). (10)
This implies:
For all tm, tn, tm ≥ tn, and all A,B ∈ Σ : p(Btm&Atn) = µ(T n−m(B) ∩ A) (11)
since T n−m(B) is the evolution of the set B backward in time from tm to tn.15
In the next section we will see how the approximate probabilistic irrelevance relates
to chaos and will finally propose an answer to our question.
5.2 New: Sufficiently Past Events Approximately Probabilis-
tically Irrelevant for Predictions
The argument I put forward to answer the main question of the paper is as follows.
(P1) Chaos can be defined in terms of mixing. (P2) Mixing systems exhibit a particular
pattern of approximate probabilistic irrelevance, which constitutes a form of unpredicta-
bility. Therefore: (C) a new implication of chaos for unpredictability is the particular
pattern of approximate probabilistic irrelevance arising from mixing.
In subsection 3.2 we have seen that premise (P1) is true. Let us now argue for
premise (P2). Recall the definition of mixing (4). I assume without loss of generality
that the event we want to predict occurs at t0. Then, assuming (9) and (11), it follows
that a system (X,Σ, µ, T ) is mixing if and only if
lim
n→∞
p(Bt0 | At−n)− p(Bt0) = 0, (12)
for all A,B ∈ Σ with µ(A) > 0. This equation holds for all, i.e. invertible and nonin-
vertible, measure-preserving systems. Berkovitz et al. ([2006], p. 676) show (12) only
for invertible systems. Moreover, they interpret their results as applying only to Hamil-
tonian systems. Many chaotic systems, e.g. all strange attractors (classes (iv) and (v) of
uncontroversially chaotic behaviour), are not Hamiltonian. Furthermore, many paradig-
matic systems like generalised logistic systems or the tent map (class (v) and part of
classes (iii) and (vi) of uncontroversially chaotic behaviour) are not invertible. Since I
am interested in the unpredictability implied by chaos, I need (12) for all systems, and
this general claim follows from (9) and (11).
15I can infer (11) from (10) as follows: Tn−m(B) contains exactly those points that are in B at
time tm. Consequently, T
n−m(B) ∩ A consists of exactly those points which pass A at time tn and
go through B at time tm ≥ tn, i.e. for which Btm&Atn is true. Thus from (10) it follows that
p(Btm&Atn) = µ(Tn−m(B) ∩A).
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From the definition of the limit, I obtain that (12) can be expressed as:
For any event Bt0 , any precision ε > 0 and any A with µ(A) > 0 (13)
there exists n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0 : |p(Bt0 | At−n)− p(Bt0)| < ε.
Hence mixing means that for predicting an arbitrary event at an arbitrary level of
precision ε > 0, any sufficiently past event is approximately probabilistically irrelevant.
Notice that due to the impossibility of determining initial conditions precisely, scientists
always consider regions of phase space corresponding to possible initial conditions. Since
these regions are not of measure zero, I am justified assuming that µ(A) > 0. In terms
of the distinction introduced in subsection 2.3, this pattern of probabilistic irrelevance
is a version of the second concept of unpredictability. Hence mixing systems exhibit a
particular pattern of approximate probabilistic irrelevance, which constitutes a form of
unpredictability: i.e. premise (P2) is true.16
Now that I have argued for the premises (P1) and (P2) of the above argument,
I conclude: (C) a general new implication of chaos for unpredictability is that for
predicting any event at any level of precision ε > 0, all sufficiently past events are
approximately probabilistically irrelevant.
To fully understand this conclusion, consider the following: for strange attractors
this claim applies in a strict sense only to events on the attractor. Yet for practical
matters there is chaotic behaviour when solutions are very near to the strange attractor
(cf. subsection 2.1); then my claim means that for predicting any event on or very
near the attractor Λ at any level of precision ε > 0, all sufficiently past events in the
neighbourhood U ⊃ Λ are approximately probabilistically irrelevant. For KAM-type
systems my claim applies, as one would like it, to each chaotic region. Moreover, as
explained in section 3.2 in discussing the uncontroversially chaotic behaviour, some may
want to adopt the broad definition of chaos via mixing, i.e. that the system is ergodic
and its phase space is decomposable into n ≥ 1 regions with disjoint interior such that
the n-th iterate is mixing on each set. When n > 1, my claim (C) has to be adapted
in the following way: the unpredictability of mixing applies to the n-th iterate on the
region of interest. This means that for predicting any event in the region of interest at
any level of precision ε > 0, all sufficiently past events that could have evolved to the
region of interest are approximately probabilistically irrelevant.
On the one hand, the unpredictability involved in my answer is strong: sufficiently
distant events are practically as independent as coin tosses. On the other hand, it
is weak since only sufficiently past measurements are approximately probabilistically
irrelevant. Restricting my claim to sufficiently past events is essential: first, many
chaotic systems are continuous, and continuity makes it impossible that for all past
times, all events are approximately probabilistically irrelevant for predictions. Second,
16 This claim can be generalised. (X,Σ, µ, T ) is mixing iff for any ρ absolutely continuous with
respect to µ and any square integrable function f : limn→∞
∫
f(x)dρn =
∫
f(x)dµ, where ρn is the
n-steps evolved measure. Interpret µ as probability and ρ as measuring our knowledge of the initial
condition. Then, assuming absolute continuity of ρ, mixing means that for arbitrary knowledge of
the initial condition after a sufficiently long time the prediction obtained by evolving the measure
is practically no better than if we had no knowledge whatsoever of the initial conditions (cf. Berger
[2001], pp. 126–32).
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we have seen that to require rapid divergence of nearby solutions for chaotic behaviour
is untenable.
What is novel about my claim? Granted, in a few publications on chaos the notion
of ‘irrelevance’ is discussed. In fact, there are two main foci; but none give my claim.
First, there is Berkovitz et al.’s ([2006]) explication of the ergodic hierarchy. Yet recall
our main argument (cf. the beginning of this subsection). As pointed out, Berkovitz
et al. only show premise (P2) for invertible systems, and they interpret their results as
only applying to Hamiltonian systems. Hence they do not argue for the general premise
(P2), and, most importantly, they do not argue for the crucial premise (P1). Therefore,
they could not arrive at the conclusion (C). Second, sometimes it is asserted that for
chaos the input is irrelevant in the sense that prediction is exponentially expensive in
the initial data, meaning that for an input string of length n all information is lost
after n steps, at which point we are totally unsure what happens next (Leiber [1998],
p. 361; Smith [1998], p. 53). However, as argued in subsection 4.2, predictions for
chaotic systems need not be exponentially expensive in the initial data; the irrelevance
shown by chaos is more subtle.
6 Conclusion
The unpredictability of chaotic systems is one of the issues that has attracted most
interest in chaos research. Nonetheless, nearly half a century after the start of the
systematic investigation of chaos, there has been much confusion about, and no correct
answer to, the question ‘What are the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’,
in the sense that chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way that other deterministic
systems are not.
I have criticised the answers in the literature to the above question. First, I rejected
the answer that chaotic systems are asymptotically unpredictable on the grounds that
also many nonchaotic systems are asymptotically unpredictable. Second, I rejected the
answer that chaotic systems are unpredictable in the sense of exponential or rapid di-
vergence of nearby solutions (often claimed with the added condition of boundedness).
For, when not requiring boundedness, many nonchaotic systems are also unpredictable
in this sense. Furthermore, in the case of requiring boundedness, there are unbounded
chaotic systems and, though unacknowledged in the philosophy literature, chaotic sys-
tems need not be unpredictable in the sense of having exponential or rapid divergence
of solutions. Third, I dismissed the answer that chaos shows a specific combination of
macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability: there are chaotic systems which are
not macro-predictable and nonchaotic systems which also show this combination of
macro-predictability and micro-unpredictability.
This prompted the search for an alternative answer. I approached this problem
by showing that chaos can be defined in terms of mixing, i.e. that mixing captures
the main pretheoretic intuitions about chaos and correctly classifies the various classes
of uncontroversially chaotic and nonchaotic behaviour. This has never been explicitly
argued for in the literature. Based on this insight, I proposed a novel general answer:
a new implication of chaos for unpredictability is that for predicting any event at any
level of precision ε > 0, all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically
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irrelevant. Chaotic behaviour is multi-faceted and takes various forms. Yet if the aim
is to identify a general new implication of chaos for unpredictability, I think this is the
best we can get.
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